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BIOETHICAL CONSIDERATION OF
MATERNAL-FETAL ISSUES
Linda Farber Post*
Introduction
Bioethics deals in large part with decisions about health care,
often hard choices requiring close scrutiny and the sensitive balanc-
ing of rights, principles, values, and interests. Not surprisingly,
some of the most difficult of these choices take place at the begin-
ning and the end of life.
The relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus is un-
like any other in law, medicine, or ethics. Within the same body,
there exist one person and one potential person with both similar
and separate interests and, for the fetus, developing rights. This set
of circumstances gives mother and fetus a biological, psychological,
moral, and legal connection that is unique.
This article examines the complexity of the maternal-fetal con-
flict, focusing on the interests of the woman and the sometimes
conflicting interests of her fetus. Part I discusses the typical analyt-
ical background of the conflict, explaining the various ethical prin-
ciples, rights, and obligations involved. Part II explores the
various choices made by the pregnant woman, as well as the state's
attempts to regulate those choices on behalf of the fetus. This arti-
cle concludes that, while the maternal-fetal relationship may give
rise to certain moral rights in the fetus and obligations in the wo-
man, these are not the same as legal rights and responsibilities on
the basis of which the state can or should intervene.
I. Analytic Framework
Because the maternal-fetal relationship is complex and unique, it
gives rise to dilemmas with both legal and ethical implications. Of
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particular concern are situations in which the welfare of the woman
and fetus appear to be at odds. In such cases, it is often the per-
ceived responsibility of society to promote the well-being of both
or, if that is not possible, to choose between them. These are ex-
tremely difficult and troubling issues about which people of intelli-
gence, compassion, and social responsibility feel passionately. In
some instances, matters that used to be confined to the doctor-pa-
tient relationship have come within the legal and public policy do-
main, often with unhelpful results.
A. Maternal-Fetal Conflict.
Maternal-fetal conflict is a term used to identify those situations
in which there is a discordance between the interests of a pregnant
woman and the fetus she is carrying. The existence and degree of
perceived conflict can be seen to depend on:
* whether the woman and fetus have independent interests and
rights deserving respect and support;
* whether obligations attach to pregnancy; and
* whether the risk to the fetus posed by the prenatal behavior of
the woman should be subject to state or medical intervention.
The ethical principles that classically inform a bioethical analysis
are autonomy (respecting the privacy and self-determination of the
individual), beneficence (providing benefits and balancing risks or
burdens against those benefits), nonmaleficence (avoiding harm),
and justice (fairly distributing the risks, burdens, and benefits).'
When the perceived interests of the pregnant woman, her fetus,
and society come into conflict, these principles are weighed and
balanced as part of the ethical calculus.2
1. Autonomy
The ethical principle of autonomy is central to the concept of the
individual and independent self,3 an idea accorded near reverence
1. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 38 (4th ed. 1994).
2. For a discussion applying the ethical principles of autonomy and beneficence
to maternal-fetal issues, see Frank A. Chervenak & Laurence B. McCullough, Per-
inatal Ethics: A Practical Method of Analysis of Obligations to Mother and Fetus, 66
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 442 (1985).
3. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 120-81. Among the meanings
included in the term are "self-governance, liberty rights, privacy, individual choice,
freedom of the will, causing one's behavior, and being one's own person." Id. at 120.
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in Western cultures. 4 Indeed, notions of self-determination are so
important in our society that the principle of autonomy is fre-
quently held to trump the other three ethical principles. Increas-
ingly reflected in legislative and judicial reasoning,5 autonomy is
one of the two aspects of the constitutional right to privacy,6 the
other being the right of selective informational disclosure.7
The principle of autonomy underlies healthcare decision making
that gives priority to the values and wishes of the individual when
they are not legitimately restricted by the rights of others. It is
only when the individual's wishes are obscure, inaccessible, or
overridden by competing principles that the judgment of others is
substituted.8 In the healthcare setting, autonomy is reflected most
prominently in the doctrine of informed consent, upholding the
right of the patient to authorize or refuse medical treatment. This
right to determine what is done to one's body9 is protected by both
4. See, e.g., H. Shaw Warren, Unlimited Human Autonomy-A Cultural Bias?,
336 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 953 (1997); Edmund S. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician
Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations in the Patient-Physician Relationship,
10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 47 (1993).
5. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (upholding statute re-
quiring copies of prescriptions for certain drugs despite the Court's recognition of an
"interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions"); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending to unmarried as well as married
people the right to use contraception and expressing that people have the right to be
free from "unwanted governmental intrusion into matters ... fundamentally affecting
a person").
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding a protected
right of privacy both in withholding information from public view and in personal
decision making); see also Margaret G. Farrell, Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance and
Process in the Abortion Debate, 68 IND. L.J. 269, 300-02 (1993). Farrell contrasts Jus-
tice Brandeis's concept of the "right to privacy as solitude" with the "right to privacy
... [as] autonomy" articulated by Justice Brennan in Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 302. For
a comprehensive discussion of the two meanings of privacy, see Tyler Baker, Roe and
Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163-64 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 (recognizing an "interest in avoiding disclo-
sure of personal matters"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that,
in support of one's right to be free from "unwanted governmental intrusion into one's
privacy," mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constituiionally be made
a crime).
8. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 170-80; see also NEW YORK
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR
PAnENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY 103-07 (1992); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J.
1985) (affirming the primacy of individual autonomy and establishing standards for
making treatment decisions on behalf of incompetent individuals).
9. One of the most well known and widely quoted expressions of this philosophy
comes from a 1914 New York State Court of Appeals decision in which Justice Benja-
min N. Cardozo wrote, "every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an
operation without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in
7591997]
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the New York State Constitution" and the United States
Constitution."
2. Beneficence and Nonmaleficence
Beneficence is the principle that underlies obligations to benefit
others and the ways in which these obligations are fulfilled.' 2
These behaviors include actions that defend, prevent harm, and
rescue those in danger. Nonmaleficence, in contrast, is the obliga-
tion to avoid doing things that are harmful.' 3 Some commentators
distinguish these two principles by saying that beneficence is con-
cerned with positive responsibilities that must be discharged
through affirmative actions to do something, while nonmaleficence,
involves negative obligations to avoid doing something.'4 It is sug-
gested, therefore, that nonmaleficence assumes primacy, while be-
neficence can be seen as ideal, rather than obligatory. 5 For this
reason, it is argued, neither common morality nor common law im-
poses general duties of affirmative action to rescue and, even in the
limited circumstances where rescue is required, there is no obliga-
tion to take action that would place the rescuer in danger.' 6
damages." Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914) (Cardozo, J.).
10. In Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986),
involuntarily committed mental patients sought a declaratory judgment regarding
their right to refuse antipsychotic medication. The Court of Appeals held that both
common law and the due process clause of the state constitution protected the indi-
vidual's right to determine the course of medical treatment, notwithstanding mental
illness. See id. at 492-93, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78. Thus, unless the state
can show a compelling interest, including the risk of a patient's self-inflicted harm or
harm to others, treatment may not be administered without the individual's consent.
See id. at 495-96, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d 80.
11. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the liberty interest of the individual in refusing
unwanted treatment, but also affirmed the right of the state to require clear and con-
vincing evidence of the individual's wish to discontinue life-sustaining treatment.
12. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 259-325.
13. Id. at 189-258.
14. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICs 24 (4th ed. 1994); BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 190-93.
15. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 189-249, 259-318; RICHARD B.
MILLER, CASUISTRY AND MODERN ETHICS 34 (1996).
16. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984). In
the healthcare setting, this principle is illustrated by the case of a patient with aplastic
anemia whose cousin, the only sufficiently compatible relative, refused to be a bone
marrow donor. The court found that, notwithstanding the urgency of the medical
situation and the morally reprehensible nature of the refusal, the law cannot compel
an individual to undergo physical invasion for the benefit of another. See McFall v.
Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (Allegheny County 1978).
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The principle of beneficence is the one with the greatest
resonance for caregivers, whose mission is to provide patients with
the greatest therapeutic benefit and shelter from harm. This sense
of nurturing and protection reaches fullest expression in caring for
those who are most vulnerable. It confers a special responsibility
on those who care for the very young, the very old, and those who
are incapable of looking after themselves.
3. Justice
The principle of justice concerns the reciprocal nature of moral-
ity, the balance between rights and duties, and the equitable distri-
bution of risk, benefits, and burdens.1 7 Justice speaks to the
fairness of a situation and the analysis by which an equitable reso-
lution to conflict is achieved. In the healthcare setting, the princi-
ple of justice is reflected in the notions of access to health care and
the allocation and rationing of healthcare resources. In the past,
these discussions and decisions concerned patients as a population
rather than as individuals and took place at a policy-making level
that was removed from the bedside. More recently, the advent of
managed care has insinuated into the clinical setting the burden of
decision making about resource allocation, bringing potential
conflicts of interest and a new dynamic to the caregiver-patient
relationship.18
B. Fetal Status
Attempts to qualify who or what is a person sometimes distin-
guish between biological and psychological human life, the latter
signifying qualities that are distinctively human, including the com-
municative and cognitive functions. Some commentators have pro-
posed lists of characteristics considered to represent personhood,
including self-awareness, a sense of time, and the ability to relate to
others.19 Others tie personhood to stages of development such as
conception, viability, or birth.2 ° This latter approach allowed the
17. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 326-87.
18. See Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Ethics in Managed Care: The Obligation of Ad-
ministration to Attending to Consequences, 2 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 443 (1996);
Jonathan Showstack et al., Health of the Public: The Private-Sector Challenge, 276 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 1071 (1996); Marcia Angell & Jerome P. Kassirer, Quality and the
Medical Marketplace-Following Elephants, 335 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 883 (1996).
19. See, e.g., JOSEPH FLETCHER, Humanness, in HUMANHOOD: ESSAYS IN Bi-
OMEDICAL ETHICS 7, 12-14 (1979).
20. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., An Almost Absolute Value in History, in
BEAUCHAMP & WALTERS, supra note 14, at 279-82; Baruch Brody, The Morality of
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Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade21 to adopt the trimester framework
for regulating abortion and the Court in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey22 to abandon it and adopt viability as the litmus test.
Still another way to frame the discussion is to look at the moral
and legal status in terms of the rights and protections accorded to
the individual. Upon birth, a baby is considered to acquire both
moral and legal standing as a separate person, and the state as-
sumes some responsibility for its well-being.23 Invoking its police
powers to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, and its
parens patriae power to protect the helpless and vulnerable, the
state on occasion will even intervene in the constitutionally pro-
tected right of parents to determine the best interests of their chil-
dren when the well-being of those children is threatened.24
But, prior to birth, when it is becoming a person, does the fetus
have interests independent of its host and, when those interests are
adverse, can it lay claim to the protection of the state against its
host? What are the obligations of the state to intervene on behalf
of the unborn? 25 In the past, courts have been reluctant to accord
legal personhood to the fetus, finding instead the potential for per-
sonhood.26 For example, attempts to prosecute as homicide the
criminally caused death of a fetus have been largely unsuccessful.
27
Abortion, in BEAUCHAMP & WALTERS, supra note 14, at 292-302. See also Susan
Sherwin, Abortion: A Feminist Perspective, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE
361-69 (John D. Arras & Bonnie Steinbock eds., 1995); Bonnie Steinbock, Abortion:
A Pro-Choice Perspective, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN MEDICINE supra, at 329-43.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a state statute that prohibits abortion except
to save the life of the mother, regardless of the stage of pregnancy or other factors, is
violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and denies a wo-
man's right to privacy).
22. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (striking down state law provisions that unduly burden a
woman's right to an abortion).
23. See, e.g., N.Y. JuD. LAw § 711 (McKinney 1983) (establishing the structure for
child protective proceedings governing state intervention to protect the welfare of
children).
24. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("The right of par-
ents to rear their children in accordance with their personal and religious beliefs gives
way when the health or safety of children is threatened or when parental conduct
poses some substantial threat to public safety").
25. See generally Thomas H. Murray, Moral Obligations to the Not-Yet-Born: The
Fetus as Patient, 14 CLINICS IN PERINATOLOGY 329 (1987).
26. See, e.g. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (observing that, rather than
protecting the interests of the fetus, tort action appears "to vindicate the parents'
interest and is thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the
potentiality of life").
27. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). But see State v.
Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990) (upholding a statute designed to protect
"human life," not "persons," and distinguishing between the two).
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The vast majority of these decisions are consistent with the com-
mon law "born alive" rule, finding no homicide unless a live birth
has occurred and there has been even a brief independent life.28
The rare cases in which courts have found protectable fetal inter-
ests have tended to address matters beyond the confines of the par-
ticular case.29
The more common approach has been to claim that child abuse
and neglect statutes include "fetus" within the meaning of the term
"child" for purposes of finding liability for failure to protect the
health and safety of the unborn.3" Some courts have found fetuses
to be deprived and neglected children,31 while others have rejected
this line of reasoning, noting lack of legislative intent to include
fetuses in the statutory protections.32
Fetal rights doctrines grant implicit legal status to the unborn.33
Recognition of this "contingent legal personhood ' '34 not only fun-
damentally alters the maternal-fetal relationship, it makes a wo-
man vulnerable to civil and even criminal liability for any acts or
28. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
29. For a discussion of the implications of judicial recognition of protectable fetal
rights, see Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With
Fetal Rights?, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 n.164 (1987).
30. For a discussion of child abuse and neglect laws and their relevance to mater-
nal-fetal conflict, see Nancy K. Rhoden, Judges in the Delivery Room: The Emergence
of Court-Ordered Caesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, nn.63-107 (1986).
31. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86 (1981)
(finding that denial of necessary medical care, including a caesarean section, renders a
fetus a neglected unborn child). Recently, for the first time, a state court of last ap-
peal upheld a woman's conviction for criminal neglect of her unborn child because
she used cocaine while pregnant. The court found that the state abuse statute in-
cluded fetuses within the meaning of the term "child." Whitner v. State, 1996 WL
393164 (S.C. Jul. 15, 1996). For an analysis of the implications of this decision, see
Ariela R. Dubler, Monitoring Motherhood, 106 YALE L.J. 935 (1996).
32. See, e.g., In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23 (Ct. App. 1981) (disapproving a
lower court order of civil commitment for fetal protection, and finding the state stat-
ute inapplicable to a fetus). Analyzing the legal implications of New York State legis-
lation mandating neonatal HIV testing, an ad hoc committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York observed, "It is imperative to note that the existing laws
regarding child abuse and neglect cover infants only after birth." Ass'N OF THE BAR
OF THE CITY OF N.Y., PRENATALJNEWBORN HIV TESTING 15 (May 9, 1994).
33. See John Robertson, The Right to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J.
LEGAL MED. 333 (1982) [hereinafter, Robertson, The Right to Procreate]; John Rob-
ertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth,
69 VA. L. REv. 405 (1983) [hereinafter, Robertson, Procreative Liberty]; Margery
Shaw, Conditional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63 (1984). For an
extensive analysis of fetal rights doctrines, see generally Gallagher, supra note 29.
34. Robertson, The Right to Procreate, supra note 33, at 352 n.92.
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failures to act during pregnancy that are or could possibly be harm-
ful to her fetus.
C. Instances of Maternal-Fetal Conflict
Abortion serves as one example of maternal-fetal conflict. The
most liberal position accords the fetus no moral or legal standing,
while the most conservative view holds that the fetus is a full
human being from the moment of conception. Between these two
extremes, the principle of respect for the autonomy of the woman
collides with the principle of nonmaleficence toward the fetus. It is
worth noting that the law has never come close to embodying the
most conservative view.
Abortion is not, however, the paradigm for the maternal-fetal
conflict analysis. Although some insist that abortion law sets via-
bility as the bright line where society can elevate fetal rights over
maternal rights,36 in fact courts have repeatedly affirmed the pri-
macy of the woman's health, interpreted broadly, in all abortion
considerations.37 In addition, it has been held that the state cannot
require the kinds of trade-offs that would base the choice of abor-
tion technique on enhancing the chances for fetal survival. 38 Per-
haps most important, the constitutionality of states proscribing
postviability abortions should not be interpreted to create new and
unique affirmative legal duties for the woman who chooses to carry
a pregnancy to term.39
35. This liability for potentially harmful behaviors was illustrated in the Whitner
decision. In Whitner, the court found that, under the child abuse statute, the woman's
actions need not actually damage the fetus. Whitner, 1996 WL 393164, at *4. Rather,
the statute only requires that her actions be "likely to endanger" the fetus. Id.; see
also Dubler, supra note 31, at 937 n.21.
36. For an analysis of this misreading of Roe, see Gallagher, supra note 29, at 15-
16.
37. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding a state right to pro-
scribe abortion to protect the life of the viable fetus "except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother."); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973);
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400
(1979) (finding that psychological and emotional factors, as well as physical factors,
must be considered in determining the health of the woman).
38. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Surgeons, 476 U.S. 747, 767
(1986) (invalidating a state statute that required using the abortion method least
harmful to the fetus unless the woman's life could only be saved with an alternate
technique).
39. For a creative and provocative illustration of society's unwillingness to impose
the same burdens on others that it imposes on pregnant women, see Judith Jarvis
Thomson's hypothetical about a woman who is forced to be connected for nine
months to a famous violinist so he can use her circulatory system. Judith Jarvis Thom-
son, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 47 (1971).
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The intended-to-be-born presents another, more- complex set of
issues because of the generally shared belief that the decision to
give birth carries significant self-imposed responsibilities. It is logi-
cally consistent to support the notion of a woman's legal right to
terminate a pregnancy in her own best interest and also the notion
of her accepting certain moral obligations should she choose to
carry the pregnancy to term. In this context, it is sometimes sug-
gested that we are looking at the heightened rights of the fetus that
is intended to be born.4° Such fetal rights advocates also argue that
the woman who chooses to forgo an abortion has executed some
implicit waiver, giving the life of the intended-to-be-born, if not
greater worth, then a least a greater claim on society's protection.41
D. Rights and Obligations
Once it is accepted that society has the right to promote the well-
being of the unborn, it is a short distance to recognizing a state
obligation to protect the fetus from harm, even when that harm is
seen to come from the mother. The controversy has been framed
in terms of two issues: "(1) what constitutes a risk of harm to the
fetus that is sufficiently grave to justify limitation of the woman's
liberty, and (2) what constitutes a legitimate reason for the woman
not to take appropriate steps to prevent harm. '42 The former focus
elevates the rights of the fetus over the rights of the mother, a no-
tion that is inconsistent with abortion law.43 The latter perspective
places the burden on the woman to justify her behavior, rather
than on the state to justify its intrusion into her life, a notion that is
inconsistent with constitutional protections.44 Together, they form
an overarching question: "What constitutes a sufficiently compel-
ling state interest to justify legal coercion of pregnant women in the
name of fetal protection?" 45 In this, as in any analysis, much de-
pends on the perspective of those framing the issues. For advo-
cates of fetal rights doctrines, the focus is on the legal status and
40. See John A. Robertson, Legal Issues in Prenatal Therapy, 29 CLINICAL OB-
STETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 603 (1986).
41. For a discussion of the notion of heightened maternal responsibilities, see
Rhoden, supra note 30, at 1979-81.
42. BEAUCHAMP & WALTERS, supra note 14, at 276 (1994).
43. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Carey v.
Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 687, 686 (1977) (finding that only a compelling state
interest will justify intrusion on an individual's privacy right, and that the intrusion
must be "narrowly tailored" to achieve the interest).
45. BEAUCHAMP & WALTERS, supra note 14, at 276.
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protection of the fetus. This article argues, as has been argued
elsewhere, that the more appropriate focus is "the legal and moral
status of women, pregnant or not."46
Attempts to justify legal intrusion for fetal benefit have resorted
to:
" prosecution of women under child abuse/neglect statutes by
attempting to find within the statutory meaning that "child"
includes a fetus; 47
* creation of a duty to prevent harm that might occur despite
the fact that there is no common law duty to rescue and the
law has never imposed the same positive legal duties on wo-
men toward their fetuses as toward their children;48 and
* medical paternalism, suggesting that any woman who does
not act in her child's best interest simply does not compre-
hend the issues and would agree to the proposed intervention
if she did understand. This notion reduces pregnant women
to the level of children or others without capacity.49 Just as
we cannot use the making of poor patient decisions (i.e.,
those with which we do not agree) as a proxy for a finding of
incapacity, we cannot use poor maternal behavior that
presents fetal risk as a reason to suspend due process, includ-
ing the requirement of informed consent.
E. Legal and Moral Rights and Responsibilities
It is critical to distinguish between legal and moral rights and
responsibilities. The law recognizes certain rights, which, taken to-
gether, create a strong presumption that a woman has a protectable
interest in not having the state intrude on her life or her pregnancy.
These rights include the collection of interests identified in the
right to privacy. While the jurisprudential parameters of the pri-
vacy right continue to shift,50 its foundation remains in substantive
46. Gallagher, supra note 29, at 14.
47. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the extension
of child abuse and neglect law to cover fetal well-being, see Rhoden, supra note 30, at
1964.
48. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
49. See Rhoden, supra note 30, at 2005-08.
50. The substantive right to the privacy of personal decision making was first ar-
ticulated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a state law
prohibiting the distribution and use of contraceptives by married couples and finding
a "right to privacy" in the "penumbras" of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments). In expanding the scope of protected personal interests, the Supreme
Court recognized that the right to privacy as autonomy is violated when the individual
is deprived of the right of personal decision making and action. However, in Bowers
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due process, those Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against
state actions that intrude into the lives of individuals, restrict their
autonomous decision making, and infringe certain fundamental
freedoms. Specific fundamental rights protected by the Constitu-
tion bear directly upon maternal-fetal issues, including the rights of
procreation 5 1 and childrearing.52 The presumption that parents will
behave in ways that further their children's best interests is so well
established 53 that only a showing of significant risk to a child will
overcome the deference generally accorded to parental decision
making. 54 In these rare cases, courts have ordered medical treat-
ment for children over parental objection. It is important to note
that, although some courts have chosen to apply this line of reason-
ing to the notion of fetal abuse or neglect, 56 this approach is gener-
ally rejected.57
When moral obligations are confused with legal duties, the result
may be a misplaced notion of state responsibility to promote fetal
well-being by intervening in maternal conduct. A woman's deci-
sion to carry a pregnancy to term does not automatically mean that
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the right to privacy does not include a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, even within the privacy of one's
home), the Court signaled its reluctance to further expand the definition of funda-
mental rights. The Court adopted yet a different approach in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (recognizing a constitutional limit to states' rights to inter-
vene in the personal decision making about family and parenting), when it replaced
the language of fundamental rights by describing privacy in terms of "substantive lib-
erties" that the state must not subject to an "undue burden." Id. at 2808, 2819.
51. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the familial
right to procreate is fundamental, and, therefore, constitutionally protected).
52. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (recognizing Fourteenth
Amendment protection of the fundamental liberty interests of parents in the custody,
care, and upbringing of their children).
53. See, e.g., Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (holding that a minor's substan-
tial liberty interest in avoiding unnecessary confinement is outweighed by the superior
decisionmaking capacity of his parents who are presumed to act in their child's best
interest).
54. See, e.g., In re Marie B., 62 N.Y.2d 352, 358, 465 N.E.2d 807, 810, 477 N.Y.S.2d
87, 90 (1984) (holding that "[f]undamental constitutional principles of due process
and protected privacy prohibit governmental interference with the liberty of a parent
to supervise and rear a child except on a showing of overriding necessity").
55. See, e.g., Joswick by Joswick v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 134 Misc.2d 295, 510
N.Y.S.2d 803 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1986) (holding that parents could not refuse
cardiac surgery that might save the life of their child); Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass.
733 (1978) (rejecting parents' choice of laetrile treatment and ordering chemotherapy
for a child with leukemia).
56. See, e.g., In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 147 Misc.2d 551, 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1990) (interpreting child abuse and neglect statutes to require therapy for
fetal benefit).
57. See ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 15-17.
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she will put the interests of the fetus ahead of her own and, how-
ever repugnant that may be to some, it does not by itself give rise
to a state obligation to inhibit maternal behavior for fetal benefit.
This in no way diminishes what most would agree is the substantial
moral obligation assumed by a woman who decides to carry a preg-
nancy to term. What must be resisted is the tendency to transform
a moral duty of nonmaleficence into a legal duty to limit
autonomy.58
The urge to invoke governmental authority in the name of fetal
protection may be seen to arise from commonly held notions about
women, their proper roles, and their responsibilities to their off-
spring-what have been called "unarticulated assumptions about
the maternal role."59 These assumptions underlie broader and
more disturbing convictions about the purpose of women (to pro-
duce strong, healthy members of society) and the corresponding
obligation of society to ensure the realization of that purpose.6 °
The justification for a presumption of social responsibility to the
unborn rests on a consequentialist or utilitarian ethical theory.61
The ethically right action (here, coercion of maternal behavior) is
the one producing the optimal outcome or consequences (here, the
preservation or promotion of fetal health). The notion that the end
justifies the means becomes more acceptable as the end becomes
more important and the means less harmful.62 This is countered by
the deontological or Kantian ethic: Some actions are wrong, in and
58. See, e.g., Patricia A. King, Should Mom Be Constrained in the Best Interests of
the Fetus?, 13 NOVA L. REV. 393 (1989).
59. Dubler, supra note 31, at 938 (quoting Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body:
a Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REV. 261, 341 n.331 (1992)).
60. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) ("[A]s healthy mothers
are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an ob-
ject of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the
race.").
61. For a review of consequentialist and deontological ethical reasoning, see
BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 42, at 47-62. For an analysis of these philoso-
phies as applied to maternal-fetal conflicts, see Rhoden, supra note 30, nn.242-73.
62. The utilitarian ethic is also invoked to point out the negative consequences of
maternal coercion in the name of fetal benefit: 1) pregnant women tending toward
behavior harmful to their fetuses will avoid necessary prenatal care because facilities
are required to report suspected child abuse to authorities; 2) the confidentiality and
trust in the doctor-patient relationship will be diminished; and 3) committing a preg-
nant woman to a correctional facility consigns her and her fetus to inferior medical
care. See Martha A. Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAW,
MEDICINE & HEALTH CARE 114 (1989); Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Preg-
nancy: Policy Crossroads, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 483 (1990).
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of themselves, no matter how desirable or important the goal.63
Using people as means to ends is always wrong, even though some
tragic consequences may result from not acting.64
II. Issues Giving Rise to Maternal-Fetal Conflict
Under any analysis, it is clear that the developing organism is
completely dependent on the gestational environment, which de-
termines in large part its safety and future health. Traditionally,
society in general and medicine in particular attended to the well-
being of the inaccessible fetus only by focusing on the health and
safety of the mother. In recent decades, however, greater knowl-
edge of prenatal behavior and its effects on gestation, and more
sophisticated techniques of intrauterine therapy allow more direct
intervention to promote fetal health. In addition, surgical tech-
niques have improved. Procedures such as caesarean sections and
even fetal surgery have become far less risky for the mother and
far more beneficial for the fetus, thereby altering the benefit-bur-
den analysis.
Likewise, there are voluntary behavioral implications. The preg-
nant woman has sole custody of this potential human life during
gestation and what she does to her own body she does also to her
boarder. For this reason, fetal advocates argue that, in choosing to
become or at least remain pregnant, a woman assumes certain re-
sponsibilities and implicitly agrees to safeguard the developing fe-
tus, even at a cost to herself.65  Others also point to these
responsibilities, but distinguish the moral nature of the obliga-
tion.66 It is essential to recognize, however, that this is not simply
another custodial relationship. Whatever intervention is done for
fetal benefit is done also to the woman. Therefore, it is argued
that, even where the threat to the unborn is great, where the bene-
fits of the proposed intervention are established "society's relation-
ship to the fetus must be mediated by the woman in whose body it
is. "67
Maternal-fetal conflict arises most often out of choices made by
the woman that risk harm to the fetus, including those based on
63. "When the judiciary acts in [a] consequentialist manner it compromises its
own integrity, because it can achieve good only by doing evil. It is far better that
some tragic private wrongs transpire than that state-imposed coercion of pregnant
women become part of our legal landscape." Rhoden, supra note 30, at 1953.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 33, at 437.
66. See, e.g., Rhoden, supra note 30, at 1980-81.
67. Gallagher, supra note 29, at 13.
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religious or ethical motivation, ignorance or self-destructive habit,
or economic imperatives.
A. Medical and Lifestyle Choices
Pregnant women may choose to do or not to do something based
on a deeply held religious or ethical tenet. In the past, these situa-
tions generally concerned refusal to undergo certain kinds of inva-
sive medical treatments, such as caesarean sections 68 and blood
transfusions.69 These cases implicate the mother's fundamental
right of religious freedom and her liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted treatment as against the state's interest in protecting the
life of the unborn. Courts have generally opted to save the fetus
where possible,7° although more recent cases place greater empha-
sis on trends honoring rights to refuse medical treatment or the
opportunity to donate organs or tissue, as well as respect for self-
determination and bodily integrity.71
A different analysis applies when dealing with voluntary and
often harmful lifestyle choices. These cases usually focus on abuse
of substances, including illegal drugs and alcohol, and depend on
state abuse and neglect laws.72 It is worth noting the distinction
between behaviors that are harmful to the fetus and independently
illegal (e.g., abuse of controlled substances) and those that are
harmful but not illegal (e.g., consumption of alcohol). Depending
on the statute under which the mother is charged, she may be liable
for criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, or civil sanctions,
including commitment. One might ask whether a woman impris-
oned to protect a fetus is being punished for abusing drugs or for
being pregnant. Likewise, if she is committed, who is being
treated?
68. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86 (1981)
(ordering a caesarean section against the religiously motivated refusal of the mother
in order to save both, and based on the "duty of the state to protect a living, unborn
human being from meeting ... death before being given the opportunity to live").
69. See, e.g., Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'l Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421
(1964) (holding that, contrary to religious objections of Jehovah's Witness mother,
blood transfusions must be given to save life of fetus).
70. See, e.g., In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 128 Misc.2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d
898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (ordering blood transfusion to save unborn).
71. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (holding that a terminally ill
woman must undergo a caesarean section to save her fetus).
72. See, e.g., Wendy Chavkin, Drug Addiction and Pregnancy: Policy Crossroads,
80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 483 (1990) (examining the three ways in which society has
responded to the problem of chemical addiction during pregnancy and arguing that it
is both unethical and counterproductive for physicians to function as law enforcement
agents).
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These cases generally have rested on two theories of prosecu-
tion:73 delivery of drugs" and violation of child abuse or neglect
laws.75
B. Employment Choices and Employer "Fetal Protection"
Policies
Another area giving rise to maternal-fetal conflict is the work-
place where some practices and conditions considered safe for fe-
male employees may not be safe for their yet-to-be-born (or even
yet-to-be-conceived). Women of childbearing age, exposed to
chemical or mechanical hazards, present health risks for them-
selves and their offspring, as well as legal liability for their em-
ployer. The conflict pits the interests of the female employee
(financial advantage and work satisfaction) against those of the fe-
tus (protection from developmental risk). Employers hoping to
avoid fetal injury, adverse publicity, increased insurance costs, and
legal liability have sometimes adopted policies excluding women of
childbearing years from certain jobs.76 On occasion, employers
have even tried to condition job eligibility on "voluntary"
sterilization.77
C. Mandatory HIV Testing of Newborns
One of the most recent and troubling manifestations of the soci-
ety-as-mother-surrogate philosophy is the move to legislatively
mandate HIV screening of neonates. Because it involves the
health of newborns and the rights of women, this issue predictably
has come to be framed in terms of the maternal-child relationship.
73. See Dubler, supra note 31, at 936 n.9.
74. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (rejecting lower court
ruling that, although ingestion of drugs took place during pregnancy, delivery took
place during the 30- to 90-second period between birth and cutting the umbilical
cord). This line of reasoning has been rejected on appeal.
75. See, e.g., In re Stefanel Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d 322, 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App.
Div. 1990) (finding that positive neonatal cocaine toxicology established a causal con-
nection between maternal drug use during pregnancy and harm to the child). Whitner
v. State is the first case of this kind that has not been overturned on appeal. 1996 WL
393164 (S.C. Jul. 15, 1996).
76. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 197
(1991) (holding that employment policies that exclude women of childbearing age
from a hazardous workplace are unconstitutional because they illegally discriminate
based on gender).
77. Id.
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New York, like most states, had routinely tested newborns anon-
ymously for the presence of the HIV antibody.78 This type of sur-
vey is a blinded public health study, intended to provide
information about the distribution of the disease, not about the in-
dividuals affected by the disease. As such, epidemiological surveys
represent an exception to the requirement for disclosure of results
to those tested, as well as the requirement for informed consent.
A new law, enacted in 1996, 79 mandates the testing of newborns
for the presence of HIV antibodies and the disclosure of the test
results to the mothers. 80 This law and the regulations that imple-
ment it have disturbing repercussions for pregnant women and new
mothers. All infants born to HIV-infected women carry the mater-
nal HIV antibodies, but this does not provide proof of pediatric
infection, because approximately 75% will throw off the maternal
antibodies within 15-18 months. The results of the seroprevalence
survey are thus reliable indicators only of infection trends in
childbearing women, not their children..
In effect, the new law does not achieve its stated intention-
identification and treatment of HIV-infected newborns; rather, it
avoids the disclosure and informed consent requirements of the
HIV confidentiality laws, and identifies HIV-infected women with-
out their consent. It has been shown that, when counseled, the
overwhelming majority of women volunteer to be tested and learn
their HIV status.8 2 Moreover, although the law does mandate pre-
test and post-test counseling of women, it does not allocate funding
for additional post-test counseling at the time of disclosure or for
tracking, retesting, or treating newborns who test positive. This is
78. See NEW YORK AIDS ADVISORY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON NEWBORN SCREENING 2-4 (February 10, 1994) (testimony, data, and report on file
with the author); Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 15.
79. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney 1996).
80. For a thorough discussion of the legal issues raised by mandatory neonatal
HIV testing, see Elizabeth B. Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Wo-
men and Newborns Must Fail: A Legal, Historical, and Public Policy Analysis, 3 CAR-
DOZO WOMEN'S L. J. 13 (1996); Linda Farber Post, Unblinded Mandatory HIV
Screening of Newborns: Care or Coercion? 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 169 (1994); Kevin J.
Curnin, Newborn HIV Screening and New York Assembly Bill No. 6747-B: Privacy
and Equal Protection of Pregnant Women, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 857 (1994); ASS'N
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 32; Letter from Association of the Bar
of the City of New York to William F. Johnson, New York State Department of
Health (Dec. 2, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter ABCNY Letter].
81. REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEWBORN HIV SCREENING OF THE NEW
YORK STATE AIDS ADVISORY COUNCIL 6 (February 10, 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter RSNHIVS]; see also Cooper, supra note 80, at 31.
82. See ABCNY Letter, supra note 80, at 1; Cooper, supra note 80, at 22.
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particularly troubling in light of the approximately 30-day lag be-
tween the test and the receipt of lab results which are to be dis-
closed to the mother.8 3 During this time, mother and infant have
left the hospital, and the mother may have already begun breast
feeding or having unprotected sex, activities that carry risk for the
woman, her sexual partner, and her baby.
Perhaps most disappointing, the provision is only for postnatal
rather than voluntary prenatal testing. Because it has been shown
that prenatal and perinatal administration of AZT reduces dramat-
ically maternal-fetal transmission of HIV, 4 it may be far more ef-
fective for women to be tested and treated during rather than after
pregnancy. Nevertheless, even assuming the effectiveness of pre-
natal testing and AZT treatment of HIV positive women,
mandatory screening would still suffer from the same infirmities as
other coercive measures. It would still be necessary to prove that
unconsented-to screening was the most effective and least restric-
tive way8 5 to get women and children into treatment, and that has
not been shown.
D. Implications of State Intervention in Maternal Behavior
Any policy of state intervention in maternal behavior for fetal
benefit has ominous implications, not only for pregnant women,
but for all women of childbearing age. Once society undertakes
the responsibility for providing every fetus with a safe, and healthy
gestational environment, the state assumes the obligation to re-
strict all potentially harmful behavior of any woman who is or may
become pregnant. This notion is especially discriminatory because
the burden falls only on women86 and customarily falls most heav-
ily on women of color and those who are poor.87 Maternal restric-
83. See RSNHIVS, supra note 81, at apps. F, G.
84. The number is reduced from 23 percent to 8 percent. See NATIONAL INST. OF
ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, CLINICAL ALERT, IMPORTANT THERAPEUTIC
INFORMATION ON THE BENEFIT OF ZIDOVUDIN FOR THE PREVENTION OF THE TRANS-
MISSION OF HIV FROM MOTHER TO INFANT (1994).
85. State measures that infringe constitutional rights, such as privacy rights, must
use the least restrictive means to accomplish ends directly related to state goals. See
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977); Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
86. For a discussion of pregnancy discrimination and gender discrimination, see
Cumin, supra note 80, at 273-313.
87. See, e.g., Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 75;
Dubler, supra note 31, at 25; George J. Annas, Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant
Patients, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1213 (1987); Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Or-
dered Obstetrical Interventions, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987).
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tions and medical interventions have either been enforced or
suggested as appropriate to enforce in the interests of fetal benefit.
These restrictions and medical interventions include actual fetal
protection interventions8 8  and suggested fetal protection
interventions.89
Assuming that the appropriate analytic focus is on the moral and
legal status of the woman, when contemplating interventions it is
necessary to consider the potential harms to a woman, as well as
the potential benefits to her fetus. Ultimately, policies of legal co-
ercion of maternal behavior for fetal benefit harm women by:
* impermissibly broadening state intrusion into traditionally pro-
tected areas of privacy and autonomy, including rights of pro-
creative and familial decision making;90
" violating doctrines of informed consent and the right to refuse
medical treatment;91
• violating the right of women to be free from unique civil or
criminal liability;92
* violating equal protection rights by targeting women, especially
women of color;93
* imposing new affirmative duties to rescue not imposed on
others; 94 and
* violating due process rights.95
88. Such interventions include compulsory blood transfusions, Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964);
In re Jamaica Hospital, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 1985, at 15 (Queens Cty., Sup. Ct., Special
Term, Part 2); compulsory medication, such as insulin, see, e.g., In re Unborn Baby
Wilson, No. 81-108 AV (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1981); compulsory caesarean sections,
see, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86 (1981); incar-
ceration to prevent harmful behavior and commitment for schizophrenia, see, e.g., In
re Steven S., 126 Cal. App. 3d 23 (Ct. App. 1981); and prosecutions of women for
legal activities, such as drinking alcohol or having sex, during pregnancy, see, e.g., In
re Danielle Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985).
89. These interventions include surveillance and involuntary hospitalization for
medication, surgery, diet; compulsory inutero and even extrauterine surgery; and
compulsory genetic testing and even abortion of severely defective fetuses. See, e.g.,
Gallagher, supra note 29, at 11, 41-46; Rhoden, supra note 30, at 2027; notes 387-88;
Murray, supra note 25, at 333.
90. See supra notes 50-54.
91. See supra notes 9-11 and 68-69 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 42-63, and 86-89 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
The issue here is not simply the interests of pregnant or even
fertile women. Rather, the issue is the legal and moral status of all
women. If society assumes the position of moral arbiter and preg-
nancy police, then women become defined by their reproductive
roles and are reduced to what have been called "fetal containers '96
and "Handmaids, ' 97 whose only purpose is breeding. This, in turn,
says a great deal about how society values women who cannot or
choose not to bear children and those who are past their fertility, as
well as those who are pregnant.
96. See George J. Annas, Pregnant Women As Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 13 (Dec. 1986).
97. See MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986).
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